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TermLending in Defense and War
THE INITIATION OF THE DEFENSE program in 1940 and the
beginning of active participation in war in late 1941 have set
forces in motion that are certain to have important effects on
the American banking system. The total impact of the vast de-
fense and war program upon American commercial banking
and upon methods of business financing is, of course, too broad
a subject to come within the scope of the present investigation.
In this chapter attention is directed only to the effect of the
war on term lending to business concerns by private and public
agencies.
Of necessity this chapter deals principally with develop-
ments that took place during the defense period. Much of the
data necessary to describe the development of the program
•and its effect on banking has been curtailed since December
1941, although wherever possible statistical information has
been brought up to date of writing. Also, the arrangements
that will be called for to finance the greater needs of active
war as contrasted to defense are only now being made and
any description of these arrangements cannot, in the nature
of things, be fully abreast of current happenings. Despite
these limitations it is possible to indicate in general terms how
the war effort is affecting term lending, for the changes pro-
duced began to show themselves during the defense period.
Furthermore, it appears likely that the principal effect of active
participation in war will be an intensification and acceleration
of these tendencies.
Scope of War Financing
The defense and later the war effort has involved a con-
siderable amount of productive activity that could not be fi-
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nanced by the conventional advance of credit to private busi-
ness enterprises. The scope of the financing must, therefore,
be measured in part in terms of the direct financing activities
of public agencies. One part of the program requires the
construction of specialized munition plants and the creation
of reserves of essential raw materials. Since this entails in-
vestments carrying very large uncertainties, special corpora-
tions have been created as subsidiaries of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to make such investments. Rubber Re-
serve Company and Metals Reserve Company acquire stocks
of rubber and critical metals, especially tin. Defense Plant
Corporation constructs plants, purchases machinery and equip-
ment, and leases these facilities to manufacturers holding de-
fense contracts. Its interests are protected by rentals received
from the lessee concerns or by contracts of reimbursement
from the War or Navy Departments. Defense Supplies Cor-
poration acquires and carries in stock essential materials, in-
cluding aviation gasoline, nitrate of soda and wool. Defense
Homes Corporation provides equity capital for housing proj-
ects located in defense production centers, in cases where
private capital is not available.
The magnitude of the activities of these corporations is in-
dicated by the fact that their total commitments (including
actual advances of cash)amounted to $9,672 million by
March 7, 1942, the commitments of Defense Plant Corpora-
tion alone being $4,798 million.'
Notwithstanding the important production activities car-
ried on directly by public agencies, the military program has
produced broad quantitative changes in business financing by
private agencies. The magnitude of this program is indicated
by the fact that between June 1940 and March 31, 1942 the
Federal government had appropriated or authorized the ex-
penditure of $137 billion (including the lend-lease program).2
Total expenditures by the various departments of the Federal
1Reportof the Secretary of Commerce, cove ring the defense and war activ-
ides of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and its subsidiaries, March 21,
1942.
2Victory,Vol. 3, No. 15, p. 32.in Defense and War 115
governmentover this same period amounted to nearly $23
billion. These vast expenditures set in motion productive
activities whose magnitudç was limited principally by the
availability of men and materials and the time required to
construct facilities and equipment for the production of mili-
tary goods. They generated great increases in employment,
volume of production and demands by business concerns for
credit to finance this production. Between mid-1940 and the
end of 1941 total loans of member banks of the Federal
Reserve System rose by $4 billion—about 30 percent.3
Definition of War Credit
'War credit is credit extended to business concerns for the
purpose of financing the production or holding of military
goods or the production of materials and equipment
for making such goods. Possession of a prime contract or a
subcontract from the Federal government definitely marks a
concern as a war producer. This definition is not entirely free
from ambiguities, and the task of separating credit extended
to finance war production from that granted to finance civilian
production is sometimes a difficult one. Modern warfare is
"total" in demanding enlistment of the totality of the nation's
economic and financial resources and in requiring the sub-
ordination of civilian demands. What specific commodities
have military value, and how can credit be traced and allocated
to the production of such commodities? The great majority
of articles produced in the economy may under some circum-
stances and in some ways contribute to the war effort, if only in
support of civilian morale.
Further to complicate the problem, most business concerns
deal in several commodities possessing varying degrees of
utility for military purposes. Credit advanced to such concerns
cannot be earmarked as to use with exactitude. Loans made
to government contractors or subcontractors engaged exclu-
sivelyproducing military equipment, materials or supplies
are dearly enough war loans. But how should one classify a
3Federal Reserve Bulletin (March 1942)p.238.116 TermLending to Business
loan to a manufacturer of steel grab buckets, who sells these
articles to steel manufacturers using them in loading the iron
ore necessary to produce the steel subsequently used in the
products of the government contractors? And how shouldone
determine what fraction of a loan to a manufacturer of lip-
stick cases also producing cartridge shells is war credit? No
doubt rough estimates can be made in the majority of cases,
but the inherent difficulties of these problems should be rec-
ognized in interpreting the data.4
Institutions Making Defense and War Loans to Business
During the initial stages of the defense program, many
businesses, especially the larger corporations that were at first
relatively more important, financed their military orders with
available working capital on hand. Other concerns took re-
course upon the customary institutional sources of business
credit, including banks, commercial finance companies, Fed-
eral Reserve banks, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
public offerings of securities through investment bankers, or
private placements of securities with life insurance companies
or other institutional investors.
Government contractors have also had an additional source
of funds for financing their contracts to completion, namely,
advance payments on contracts made with the War or Navy
Departments. Legislation passed during 1941 permitted these
executive agencies to advance, from available appropriations,
In reporting defense loans and commitments held on April 30, 1941, weekly
reporting member banks of the Federal Reserve System were instructed as
follows: "Include all commitments and loans made directly or indirectly for
national defense purposes, whether or not secured by assigned government con-
tracts, and whether made to prime contractors or to subcontractors. If the pro-
ceeds of a commitment or loan are to be used only in part for defense purposes,
the reporting bank should if practicable, make an estimate of the amount so
used and report only this amount. In the absence of information of the contrary,
however, it may be assumed that if a borrower is engaged to a substantial
extent directly or indirectly in providing facilities, supplies, or equipment for
national defense, all new loans and commitments to such a borrower since the
defense program was inaugurated oustanding on April 30,1941, may be re-
ported as being for the purpose of financing the defense program." See "Instruc-
tions for Preparation of Reports on Form F.R. 550," Federal Reserve Bulletin
(September 1941) p. 873.In Defense and War 117
sumsnot exceeding 50 percent of the contract price of supplies
or facilities, of which advance two-fifths may go to subcon-
tractors participating in the completion of the contract. These
advances may be authorized by Army or Navy officials with-
out approval from Washington provided they do not exceed
$100,000 on any one contract. Although data are not available
to measure accurately the importance of this and other sources
of defense credit, rough estimates of the roles played by the
most important defense lending institutions—commercial banks
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation—may be made.
Commercial banks far surpass any other type of lending
institution in the volume of such financing of business. It is
likely that banks are making more than four-fifths of the
number of all war loans and extending more than 90 percent
of the amount of all credit advanced. About 5 percent of the
number and amount of war loans are made by the RFC, and
the balance by other institutions, such as factoring and com-
mercial financing companies and Federal Reserve banks. These
conclusions may be drawn from analysis of military contracts
assigned by contractors to lending institutions during the
period February 1941-January 1942, information on which is
given in Table 15. It is assumed that the proportion of loans
disbursed to amount of defense contracts assigned was the
same for each type of lending institution.
The aggregate amount of defense loans held by commercial
banks at the end of April 1941 fell just short of $1
If this estimate is correct, it appears that as a maximum such
loans roughly constituted a third of the $2.75 billion increase
in total loans of member banks between mid-1940 and mid-
1941. The other two-thirds comprised credit granted to finance
business expansion resulting from these defense activities.
Moreover, the volume of defense lending by commercial banks
This estimate is based on the fact that weekly reporting member banks of
the Federal Reserve System, which account for about 49 percent of the amount
of all loans and discounts in the American banking system, reported holding
3,630 defense loans totaling $460 million on April 30, 1941. (In addition, these
banks had outstanding 2,254 commitments to make loans aggregating $633 mil-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.In Defense and War 119
grewvery rapidly during 1941 and 1942, as the war produc-
tion program expanded to encompass a larger number of busi-
ness enterprises. During this twelve-month period the number
of war loans increased by more than six times and the amount
of such loans more than quadrupled, to judge from the volume
of contracts assigned to lending institutions by government
contractors.6
Up to March 7, 1942 the RFC had authorized 675direct
loans to some 480 different business enterprises engaged in
war production, under both its regular business loan powers
and the special defense lending powers acquired by it on June
25, 1941. Under both laws nearly $665 million of defense
and war credit had been authorized by that date. In addition
to its direct loans to business concerns the RFC has cooperated
with banks in their war loan programs by taking participations
in credits extended to concerns engaged in war production.
Up to March 7, 1942, the Corporation had authorizations of
such participations in the amount of $23 million on loans
aggregating $37 million. While this amounts to a very large
volume of direct loans and participations, the major contribu-
tion of the RFC to the volume of defense and war lending has
been its loans to, and purchases of capital stock of, its sub-
sidarydefensecorporations,which,asindicatedabove,
amounted to nearly $10 billion by March 7, 1942.
Term Lending of
Commercial Banks in Defense and War
The proportion of all war loans that are made on a term
loan basis, that is, the proportion having a term of over one
year, is not significantly different from the proportion of term
o See Table C-4. It is assumed that loans not accompanied by assignments of
claims grew at a rate equal to those so accompanied, and that the proportion
of loans granted to amount of assigned contracts remained constant throughout
the period. Another evidence of growth in bank lending for defense is that 369
banks located in 142 cities reported to the American Bankers Association that
they held 6,219 defense loans amounting to more than 517 million at the end
of June 1941. In short, a group of banks roughly comparable in number and
size to the weekly reporting member banks held defense loans 71 percent larger
in number and 13 percent larger in amount than the weekly reporting banks
had had oustanding only three months earlier.120 TermLending to Business
loans to total business credits extended before the defense
period. To the extent that defense and war have affected term
lending it has been by changing the characteristics of term
loans made rather than by increasing the relative importance
of term loans. Thus, about 7 percent of the number and
21 percent of the amount of the defense loans made by
medium-sized and large commercial banks are term loans, run-
fling a year or more to maturity; term loans held by large
commercial banks at the end of 1940 were estimated to con-
stitute 22 percent of all loans and discounts held by them.7
Like traditional business loans, many loans were written to
run less than one year but were expected by both banker and
borrower to be renewed at maturity and to extend more than
one year. Data on all defense loans held by weekly reporting
member banks of the Federal Reserve Systemthe end of
April 1941, showing their distribution by term at time of
making, are given in Table 16.
Table AND AMOUNT OF DEFENSE LOANS
HELD BY WEEKLY REPORTING MEMBER BANKS AT APRIL
30, 1941, BY TERM AT TIME OF MAKINGa (dollar figures in
thousands)
Numberof Loans of Loans
Term at Time of
Making
Number Percent Amount Percent
Non-instalment loans
Less than 1 year 2,976 82.0 $324,236 70.5
1—2 years 42 1.2 13,301 2.9
2—3 years 17 .5 1.603 .3
3—5 years 41 1.1 24,088 5.2
5 years and over 9 .2 3,328 .7
Instalment loans
Less than 1 year 168 4.6 20,258 4.4
1 year and over 160 4.4 53,585 11.6
Miscellaneous loans 217 6.0 19,713 4.3
ALL LOANS 3,630 100.0 $460,112 100.0
Total—less than 1 year 3.144 86.6 344,494 74.9
Total—i year and over 269 7.4 95,905 20.8
Based upon tabulationsfurnishedbythe BoardofGovernorsoftheFederal
Reserve System.
See Appendix A.In Defense and War 121
Onesignificant result of defense financing is a gradual ex-
tension of term credits of smaller size, presumably to business
concerns of smaller proportions. The average amount of term
loans made for military purposes, and held by weekly report-
ing member banks of the Federal Reserve System at the end
of April 1941, was $357,000. This amount is only 54 percent
of the average size of all term loans held by comparable
banks at the middle of 1941. A reasonable interpretation is
that ever-smaller concerns are receiving Federal contracts or
subcontracts to produce goods of military value. These enter-
prises need credits running for more than a year in order to
acquire the plant, machinery and equipment, and working
capital necessary to finance their contracts to completion.
A second important effect of the military program upon
bank term lending has been a definite change in the pattern of
use of term credit obtained by borrowing concerns. Whereas
only a third of the amount of all bank term loans held at mid-
1941 provided new money to borrowers (the remaining two-
thirds being for retirement of outstanding debt or preferred
stocks), term loans made for defense purposes were all new
money loans. Thirty-seven percent of the amount of term
loans for military production held by weekly reporting banks
on April 30, 1941 provided funds for new plant facilities,
43 percent provided working capital for expanded production,
and the balance was used for a combination of these purposes.8
A third repercussion of war financing upon term lending
by commercial banks has been an increasing emphasis upon
the term loan agreement and a decreasing emphasis upon
collateral security. War term loans of banks are secured
by assignment of government claims less frequently than other
term loans are collaterally secured. As much as 72 percent
of the number and 70 percent of the amount of war term
loans were not accompanied by assignment of government
claims. As this is the type of security most likely to be used
in connection with a term loan, it appears improbable that
loans not secured by government claims were secured by other
8SeeTable C-6.122 Term Lending to Business
assets. The implication is that, in the majority of instances,
the borrower's credit standing was considered so satisfactory
that the taking of collateral security appeared unnecessary.
No important change has occurred with respect to repay-
ment provisions. Term loans for defense purposes display
little difference in this regard from other term loans. Fifty-six
percent of the amount and 60 percent of the number of such
term loans were repayable in instalments. The fact that an
even larger fraction of these term loans is not amortized in
instalments is probably to be explained by the use of loan
proceeds. The defense and war loans finance the execution of
specific government contracts and the borrower's ability to
repay is created at time of delivery of completed goods to
the government
In summary, itis accurate to say that defense and war
financing of business, while not altering any of the fundamental
characteristics of term loans described earlier in this study, is
serving to accelerate and emphasize the use of certain of
their distinguishing features. It appears to have accelerated
tendencies that were evident in the pre-defense period, namely
a tendency toward the making of smaller loans, a shift toward
new money uses and away from refinancing and a decreasing
emphasis on the use of the different forms of security. Fur-
thermore, it seems probable that these tendencies may be
intensified during the war period.
War Term Lending of Public Agencies
Although the RFC has since 1934 possessed power to make
loans to business concerns, and in fact authorized many de-
fense loans under its original powers, on June 25,1940it
was granted even broader authority.9 By Act of Congress, the
RFC was permitted to make loans to (or with the approval
of the President to purchase the capital stock of) any business
corporation for the purposes of "(a) producing, acquiring
and carrying strategic and critical materials, as defined by the
President, or (b) for plant construction, expansion and equip-
Public, No. 664, 76th Congress.Jn Defense and War 123
ment,and working capital to be used by the corporation in
the manufacture of equipment and supplies necessary to the
national defense, on such terms and conditions and with such
maturities as the Corporation may determine."10 Obviously
this Act greatly expanded the powers of the RFC to make
loans to concerns engaged in military production.
There were no requirements in the 1940 law that bor-
rowers be solvent, that loans be of such sound value or so
secured as to assure repayment, or that credit be unavailable
at prevailing rates for the class of loan applied for—restric-
tions all contained in the original 1934 business loan legisla-
tion. The existence of a national emergency presumably was
deemed sufficient cause for relaxing credit standards applica-
ble to concerns producing or holding materials vital to na-
tional welfare. Inferentially, the philosophy was that the RFC
should assume greater risks in granting credit to that periph-
eral group of concerns unable to obtain credit either from
private agencies or from the RFC under its regular business
loan powers, in order to assure an expeditious mobilization
of military production.
Although data are not available on the term to maturity of
defense loans made by the RFC, certain inferences with re-
spect to the term of these loans may be made from an analysis
of the use of the funds by borrowing concerns. About a third
of the amount of RFC defense credit was designated as being
used for working capital only, about a quarter for acquisition
of plant facilities only, and the remainder for repayment of
debts or combinations of purposes. To an' overwhelming ex-
'°Asthe law did not specify how the RFC should determine that credit would
be used by an applicant "in the manufacture of equipment and supplies neces-
sary to the national defense," it is uncertain whether this phrase required an
applicant to hold a prime contract, to be a defense subcontractor, or to be a
producer of machinery and equipment necessary to the operations of either or
both prime contractors or subcontractors. The Corporation has announced that
itis impracticable to specify in advance the particular terms and conditions
upon which defense loans will be authorized, the Directors making the final
determination in each case of the extent to which the credit will aid the national
defense program. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Circular No. 23, "In-
formation Concerning Loans and Purchases to Aid in the National Defense Pro-
gram" (July 1940) p. 2.124 TermLending to Business
tent, the indicated purpose for which RFC defense credits
have been granted to borrowers is the provision of new money
(Table 17). It seems reasonable to infer that credit utilized
for acquisition of plant, machinery and equipment is repayable,
at least in part, after the lapse of one year.
The RFC has made a large number of small loans, pre-
sumably to small enterprises, and thus has served a group of
borrowers similar in size to those receiving normal business
credit from it. Up to mid-September 1941, loans of less than
$50,000 accounted for about two-thirds of the number of de-
fense loans authorized but only for 1.3 percent of the amount.
On the other end of the scale, ten loan authorizations each
for $10 million or more accounted for nearly two-thirds of
the amount of RFC defense credit granted to business. These
RFC loans have gone to a large number of very small con-
cerns and to a few very large concerns. Many of the small
borrowers have operated air training schools and services,
and have sought credit wherewith to purchase small training
planes. Because of their extremely small size and lack of ap-
preciable equity funds in the business, they have not been first-
class credit risks. Five of the ten very large authorizations
were made to aircraft manufacturers for plant expansion or
working capital to complete government contracts. Data are
given in Table 17.
Concerns performing air training and transport service
and manufacturers of miscellaneous Army equipment and sup-
plies have provided the largest number of RFC defense bor-
rowers. Manufacturers of aircraft and parts, and of critical
metals and other materials, have accounted for almost two-
thirds of the total amount of defense credit extended. Con-
tractors engaged in construction work or in shipbuilding have
not resorted to the RFC for funds on as large a scale as have
producers of Army equipment and supplies.'1
Analysisof the amount of all defense contracts awarded from June 13, 1940
through August 30, 1941 indicates that 17.2 percent were for construction, 2B.O
percent for ships, 27.4 percent for airplanes and parts, and 27.4 percent for
ordnance and supplies. See National Industrial Conference Board, to
the Conference Board Economic Record (September 1941).in Defense and War 125
Table17—NUMBER AND AMOUNT OF DEFENSE LOANS
AUTHORIZED BY THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPO-
RATION TO SEPTEMBER 13,1941, BYUSE OF FUNDS, BY
SIZE OF LOAN AND BY TYPE OF PRODUCT OR SERVICE OF
BORROWERa (dollar figures in thousands)
Numberof Loans Amount of Loans
NumberPercentAmountPercent
USE OF FUNDS
New money only 377 90.2 $2.l1.355 79.5
Working capital only 126 30.1 88,187 33.1
Acquisition of machinery or equipment
only 135 32.4 2,077 .8.
Acquisition of plant only 39 9.3 66,984 2.5.2
Combination of purposes 77 18.4 54,107 20.4
Repayment of debt oniy 8 1.9 40,048 15.1
Combination of new money and repay-
ment 33 7.9 14,232 5.4
TOTAL 418 100.0 $265,635 100.0
SIZEOF LOANS
Under$5 20 4.8 $78 b
5—10 125 29.9 873 .3
10—50 122 29.2 2,765 1.0
50—100 30 7.2 2,000 .8
100—500 79 18.9 15,418 5.8
500—1,000 10 2.4 7,308 2.8
1,000—10,000 22 5.2 60,973 23.0
10,000 and over 10 2.4 176,220 66.3
TOTAL 418 100.0 $265.635 100.0
TYPEOF PRODUCT OR SERVICE OF BORROWER
Airtraining service 171 40.9 $6,070 2.3
Aircraft and parts 41 9.8 96,991 36.5
Naval construction, repairs and parts 28 6.7 10,788 4.1
Army equipment and supplies
(except guns and ammunition) 94 22.5 22,571 8.5
Guns, ammunition and components 36 8.6 7.799 2.9
Defense housing and public utilities 10 2.4 10,288 3.9
Critical metals and materials 21 5.0 69,746 26.2
Other, and no information 17 4.1 41,382 15.6
TOTAL . 418 100.0 $265,635 100.0
aBasedupon releases by the Federal Loan Agency of Letters of Jesse Jones ro Con-
gress, dated May 9 and September 16, 1941. Includes under both
Section 3d of the RFC Act and Act of June 25, 1941. Cancellations or recissions of
authorizations no deducted.
b Less than .05 percent.126 TermLending to Business
Federal Reserve banks have participated in the war financ-
ing program in two ways. First, as will be shown below, they
act as liaison agencies of the War and Navy Departments and
the Maritime Commission in extending guarantees to lenders
against loss on loans made to concerns to finance the comple-
tion of war orders.'2 Second, through industrial advances
made under section 13b of the Federal Reserve Act the banks
have extended credit directly to contractors. This aspect of
war financing (while still relatively small as contrasted to other
sources of credit for war contractors) has tended to increase.
While the total amount of industrial advances increased only
slightly from the beginning of 1941 to March 1942, commit-
ments and participations outstanding more than doubled.
Credit StandarcLs and
Procedures in Defense and War Financing
In financing business enterprises producing war materials
and supplies, bankers have not been confronted with credit
problems essentially different from those of normal times, but
they have had to make certain adaptations in their credit stand-
ards and procedures. The need for bringing the entire pro-
ductive capacity of the nation rapidly into utilization has
entailed: first, extension of additional amounts of credit to
borrowers with long-established credit relationships; second,
opening of new lines of credit to concerns (many of them
small and financially weak) with which lending institutions
had not previously had credit relations. To enable lenders to
meet these new credit demands and yet protect themselves
against loss, certain new devices for facilitating the flow of
funds have been evolved.
One important facilitating deviceisthe Assignment of
Claims Act of 1940, which permits all claims against the Fed-
eral government for payments of $1000 or more to be as-
signed to "a bank, trust company, or other financing institu-
12Guaranteesare provided for in Executive Order No. 9112 issued on March
26, 1942 (Federal Reserve Bulleiin, April 1942, pp. 299-301) and are extended
under Regulation V of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Federal Reserve Bullelin, May 1942, pp. 424-27).In Defense and War 127
tion, including any Federal lending agency."18 Claims may be
assigned under contracts either for supplies or for plant facili-
ties. When a claim is assigned, written notice together with
a copy of the assignment must be filed by theassignee with
the General Accounting Office, with the contracting officer
of the Federal government or the head of his department,
with the company supplying the contractor's surety bond,
and with the Federal disbursing officer, if any, designated in
the contract to make payment. Further to protect lenders, the
Act permits the War or Navy Departments to write contracts
with suppliers under which payments are not subject to re-
duction or set-off of tax or other debts due the Federal gov-
ernment by the assignor.
Another device which facilitates the flow of credit into war
production is the Emergency Plant Facilities Contract. Many
manufacturers have hesitated to expand their plants in the
belief that this expansion might be worth little or nothing at
the end of the emergency. •The Emergency Plant Facilities
Contract provides that a manufacturer can erect a plant certi-
fied as necessary for national defense and be reimbursed the
entire cost by the Federal government in 60 equal monthly
instalments following completion of the facilities. At the ter-
mination of period, title passes to the government, unless
the contractor desires to retain the plant. In the latter case,
he contractor may purchase the plant at cost less the depre-
ciation specified in the contract or at a lower negotiated price.
The contract thus provides a favorable distribution of risk
between contractor and government, in leaving to the con-
tractor the normal risks of production, but in requiring the
government to carry the risk of obsolescence and excessive
plant capacity at the end of the emergency. By assignment of
payments due from the government under such contracts, con-
tractors can secure funds from banks to finance plant construc-
tion.
A third facilitating device for encouraging private financing
Public, No. 811, 76th Congress. Approved October 9, 1940.128 Terni Lending to Business
of plant expansion is a ruling of the Treasury Department
that when a concern expands a plant, certified as necessary
for national defense, it may amortize the total cost over a
period of 60 months, deducting this amortization from its
income for tax purposes.'4 Such amortization may be allowed
whether the plant expansion is privately financed or financed
under an Emergency Plant Facilities Contract. This ruling
has stimulated expansion of plants in which business concerns
have definitely intended to retain an interest after the emer-
gency.
Further steps taken to expedite the completion of financing
arrangements •for concerns—particularly smaller concerns—
having war production contracts have recently been announced
by the Federal government. On February 19, 1942 the RFC
authorized its thirty loan agencies to approve, on their own
responsibility, loans not in excess of $100,000 without re-
ferring them to Washington. Further to facilitate produc-
tion, the War Production Board established a Bureau of
Finance in its Division of Industry Operations to furnish
advice and assistance on financing arrangements to holders of
contracts and to concerns desirous of obtaining contracts. Ar-
rangements are sought for loans from commercial banks and,
where such are not possible, for loans from the RFC, a Fed-
eral Reserve bank or some other public financing agency.
Finally, a recent Executive Order has authorized the War
Department, Navy Department and Maritime Commission
to enter into contracts with financial institutions, both public
and private, guaranteeing, in whole or in part, loans made by
these institutions to finance war contractors and
The War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Com-
mission are empowered to extend this guarantee where they
believe the work being done is essential to the prosecution of
the war. Furthermore, the War and Navy Departments and
the Maritime Commission are authorized in this Executive
Order to make loans directly to war contractors or to partici-
'4T. D. 5016 relating to Second Revenue Act of 1940, Sections 23, 24.In Defense and War 129
patewith any public or private lending agency in the making
of such loans.15
Under this program the Federal Reserve banks act as
liaison agencies between the Federal departments, financial
agencies and war contractors. Wherever possible the Federal
Reserve banks attempt to arrange the credit extension without
guarantee, through private agencies, through the RFC, or
through their own facilities as provided for under Section
13b of the Federal Reserve Act. If this is not feasible the
banks arrange a guarantee of all or part of the loan by the
Federal department concerned. As a last resort, the public
agency may extend funds directly, making the entire loan or
taking a participation therein. Regulation V, which governs
operations under this plan, provides that rates of interest,
maximum or otherwise, are to be specified from time to time
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
after consultation with the Federal departments and the
Reserve banks and that the maturity of the loans made or
guaranteed in whole or in part under this plan shall not exceed
five years.
The availability of loan guarantees has had a profound
effect on the credit appraisal problem faced by lending institu-
tions in making war contract loans. This protection has greatly
reduced the major source of risk in war lending, namely that
the contractor will fail satisfactorily to produce the materials
contracted for according to all the specifications of the con-
tract, along with the other risks attendant upon such loans.
These loan guarantees do not, however, dispose entirely of
the problem of credit appraisal in the making of war loans.
Lending agencies are encouraged to take only partial guaran-
tees. For this reason they necessarily examine loan applications
with care though it is the objective of the guarantee to reduce
to a minimum the limitations that peacetime credit rules and
standards set on production. Further, it is stated in Regulation
V that the objective of the plan is to obtain "maximum war
production expeditiously" but that the Federal Reserve banks
ExecutiveOrder No. 9112 issued March 26, 1942.130 Term Lending to Business
"will make reasonable efforts to afford the War Department,
Navy Department and the Maritime Commission the best
available protection against possible financial loss consistent
with this objective."
Before the availability of loans and guarantees from the
War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission,
the focus of the credit analysis was the likelihood that the
borrower could actually produce and deliver the commodities
called for by the contract. Under present arrangements, even
though a guarantee may be given against nonperformance on
the part of the contractor, there remains the necessity of sift-
ing out those contractors eligible to receive this degree of
protection. It is obviously necessary to make careful judgments
where only partial guarantees are taken. Also, an assessment
of the competence of the contractor in estimating and con-
trolling costs remains vital in credit analysis of defense and
war loans, for it determines how much credit is required in
order to complete the contract. The lending and guaranteeing
agencies must be satisfied that the contractor has adequate
plant capacity and can obtain the necessary raw materials,
skilled labor and transportation facilities. Finally, quite aside
from questions of creditworthiness there is the further point
that the urgency of our need for war materials is such that
the technical efficiency of the contractor must be judged care-
fully by the agency extending a guarantee against default
through nonperformance.
The credit standards applied to defense loans made under
the regular business loan powers of the RFC were such that,
as a group, these loans were expected to "stand on their own
feet" and pay out without loss to the Corporation. Loans
made under the Act of June 25, 1940 represented credits ex-
tended for the most part at the request of the Army or the
Navy Department, and granted to concerns producing urgently
needed military supplies. As a class, these latter loans have
carried larger risks to the lender. For a time many of the bor-
rowers were subcontractors who, unlike direct contractors
with the Federal government, were then unable to obtain anin Defense and War 131
advancefrom the government to aid in financing their pro-
duction and sorely lacked working capital. The major risk
assumed by the RFC in granting credit to these concerns has
been that the borrowers may have inadequately estimated
the costs. This contingency has been especially likely in de-
fense and war production, much of which involves products
that are experimental or new to the manufacturing concern.
The problems presented to the RFC by these loans have been
reduced greatly by the facilitating legislation reviewed above.
All these aspects of credit analysis necessarily become more
difficult as the war effort widens and intensifies. As more con-
cerns are drawn into war production it is inevitable that smaller
concerns and, further, less efficient producers must be utilized.
Both of these tendencies, and in particular the latter, increase
the risks attendant upon war term lending. While the burden
of carrying the risks may be shifted in whole or in part by a
guarantee, this does not, of course, reduce the losses that will
eventually be sustained. This necessity of extending term credit
to relatively high-risk concerns is likely to have a significant
effect on the future of term lending. The experience thus gained
by lending agencies should raise their ability to lend funds to
relatively small concerns within manageable limits of risk. The
resulting accumulation of experience and development of skill
cannot fail to have a lasting effect on business lending policy
and practice.